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they can be made adds rather than detracts to the value of the
work as a teaching aid. Substantially everything of importance
in administrative law is touched upon after all and an analysis
completely satisfactory to every devotee is hardly attainable.
The format is conventional and good; some, to be sure, would
prefer the paging to be given its usual place and the sectionizing
relegated to lesser dominance. Likewise, reference to pages in
the index and case table, rather than to sections, though more
laborious, would have given readier access to the author's analysis and documentation. However, this deficiency is in part
compensated for by a detailed table of contents referenced to
sections and pages.
Melvin G. Dakin*
LAW OF TORTS, by Leon Green, Wex S. Malone,
Willard H. Pedrick, and James A. Rahl, West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul. Pp. xxvi, 855.

CASES ON THE

In 1931, Dean Leon Green published his Judicial Process in
Tort Cases, and in 1939 his second edition appeared. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, Dean Green was quite
churlish to prior compilers of torts materials. His materials expressed ingenuity and did not follow what had evolved to be the
classical structure of torts casebooks. Adopting what has been
called a functional perspective and viewing the subject matter
from the eclectic approach of sociological jurisprudence, Dean
Green pointed to the work environment of rule and doctrine. It
was a unique collection of materials.
This year, in collaboration with able assistants, an even finer
if less novel collection of tort materials has appeared under the
new title Cases on the Law of Torts. The current edition, although it features a sparkling collection of recent cases and new
text, follows the same outline and general organization of the
earlier editions except for the addition of new materials on "injuries resulting in death" and "conversion" and the elimination
of materials on defamation and privacy which have been incorporated into a separate volume to be used in a separate course
in relational interests. But it is not the details but the structure
of these materials and their impact upon students of torts which
warrants our examination.
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Sir Henry Maine thought that the evolution of law might be
traced from the stage of primitive law, through a period of strict
law, an era of equity and natural law, to a "maturity of law,"
up to a period of "socialization of law." If by "socialization"
we mean the perception that law is but one means of social control, a means rather than an end, with the function of furthering
the values of our time and place, and if by that term we mean
placing law in context and observing it pragmatically, then it
may be said that this casebook reflects the jurisprudence of our
times and is a product of the age of "socialization." Dean Green,
Wex Malone, Willard Pedrick, and James Rahl - these four
tortsmen of the metamorphosis - have gone beyond analysis
and synthesis and have illumed the subject matter so that we
may see and test the social implications of rule and doctrine.
If we examine their contribution from the standpoint of the
methods of jurisprudence, we would classify it as an exercise of
the method of sociological jurisprudence. Although in this respect Cases on the Law of Torts is not a unique collection of
materials, in either law or torts, and by comparison it becomes
a matter of degree, nonetheless both the original edition and this
up-to-date revision are remarkable for their emphasis upon the
environmental setting for legal concepts. There are constant
reminders of context. The introduction explains that the materials are arranged upon the basis of Pound's theory of interests. Note material, statistical data, economic and social factors,
particularly in connection with the traffic and transportation
chapter, keeps one eye of the student glued to policy and consequences while the other is free to roam through rules and legal
doctrine. This means that rule and doctrine are placed in a
nexus which differs from that of the usual torts casebook. Facts
and consequences, if not truth and consequences, are focal points
for study. Freshmen still needs must learn to split the hairs of
doctrine and dogma, distinguish and analogize. But in addition
to the usual microscope, a telescope is handed them. They need
not grub in the ground in search of stars. The context or setting
for living law, the consequences, and the interplay of facts and
principles, are part of the view. Experience as well as logic
becomes the life of tort law.
I suppose what we are talking about is the personality of a
book. Dean Green's original volume was one of the first departures from a predominantly analytical approach to law.
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Shulman and James later followed the path blazed by Green and
in their own way utilized sociological material. In other areas2
of law, so too did McDougal and Haber,' Michael and Wechsler,
Fowler Harper, 8 and Max Rheinstein, 4 to mention but a few outstanding examples of a sociological approach. Even the materials which might arbitrarily be classified as predominantly
analytical, such as Seavey and Keeton, 5 and Smith and Prosser,6
have not overlooked sociological material, although the personality of these fine books remains analytical rather than sociological, as their impact is that of rule and doctrine rather than
social values, principles rather than the roots of principles.
Perhaps a description of the sequence of materials may
illustrate the nuances of differences. As in Green's original edition, the new volume commences in Chapter I with note material which pictures the governmental setting of law and a
brief statement of Pound's Theory of Interests. In Chapter II
the sequence is from assault and battery cases, verbal assaults
or insults, wire-tapping, various other intentional torts down to
eviction and scrambled possession. Commencing with Section 5,
"Use of Firearms," the functional perspective takes hold.
"Sports and Practical Jokes," "Conduct of Children and Insane
Persons," "Fright and Nervous Shock," are section headings.
Chapter III covers the "Care and Treatment of Ill, Disabled and
Irresponsible Persons," Chapter IV, "Occupancy, Ownership, Development of Land," with sub-sections on "Fire," "Water," and
"Various Activities." Chapter V deals with "Public Service
Companies," Chapter VI with "Governmental Torts," Chapter
VII with "Builders, Contractors, Workmen," Chapter VIII with
"Manufacturers, Dealers," and Chapter IX with "Traffic and
Transportation."
This sequence and grouping of materials is a factual rather
than a doctrinal one. Obviously, it is at the expense of some
symmetry. and sacrifices a logical denouement of principles. One
catches glimpses of doctrine and principle but chameleon-like
they change color or contour with a change of setting. Thus a
freshman student is denied the comfort or the illusion of fixed
1. PROPITY, WEALTH,
(1948).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

LAND:

ALLOCATION,

PLANNINO

CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940).
PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (1952).
CASES ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES (1947).
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1957).
CASES-AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (1952).

AND

DEVELOPMENT
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principles and the law becomes for him a seamless web. In lieu
of dogma he gets the lawyer's feel for facts and what lies behind
doctrine. But one may ask, is there any more certainty in a
priori reasoning from facts than from doctrine? Facts may be as
elusive as concepts. It is a commonplace that lawyers are perhaps more shocked by the version of facts recounted in appellate
decisions than they are by the court's selection of principles.
Selectivity is exercised as to both. Just as there is a wide range
of choice between precedents and principles, there is a similar
latitude as to operative facts. Pragmatically, both facts and
principles are or may be stimuli for decision, or tools for rationalization, and a choice or selection between competing facts and
principles depends upon a diversity of social and personal factors
which, despite Professor Oliphant's invitation 7 have never been
fused into a science of law.
It may be true that the late Jerome Frank's emphasis upon
the fact-finding function and Green's division of labor between
judge and jury is realism in a jurisprudential sense. It may be
true that factual setting, or functional grouping, is the lawyer's
approach to law. But realistically, is an orientation towards the
fact content merely another mechanical rabbit, just as elusive
a quarry as rule and doctrine? It would seem so. Hence, regardless of orientation, to be truly functional or realistic, legal
materials must stress the jurisprudential problem of what determines selection and choice. On this score, Green and his coauthors have done very well. The economic and sociological
changes which require mutation and modification of old theories
are delineated or become apparent upon reflection, with or without prompting from the instructor. The note on Horse and
Buggy Traffic in Chapter IX is an example of this, as are the
materials on accident rates, juvenile automobile accident rates,
"traffic cases and the law -

what next ?," and a note on English

legislation. Note material as well as arrangement of cases provokes contemplation of basic social values and the consequences
of decisions.
It is interesting to note how far we - or rather Dean Green
and associates - have come. Not too long ago, there was vehement argument over whether analytically one could properly
7."[N]ot the judge's opinion, but which way they decide cases, will be the
dominant subject-matter of any truly scientific study of law." Oliphant, A Return
to Stare Deojas, 6 Am. L. SCHOOL REv. 215 (1928), reprinted in COHEN & COHEN,
READINGS ON JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 566, 569 (1951).
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conceive of "torts" as a distinct subject. It was argued that
there were no unifying principles or universals to weld together
torts law in the sense that there was a law of contracts or real
property. Analytical teachers came to the rescue, fashioned or
perceived postulates, and the subject achieved the dignity of
identity, albeit it was jerry built from what was left over from
contracts and criminal law. The analysts and logicians made
their contribution in systematizing the subject, in classification.
Concentration upon fusion of the subject into an integrated
whole, inevitably, led to some neglect in inter-relating torts to
the larger scene. To complete the picture, to avoid a confusion
of means with ends, it became essential that the subject be related to the values of our time and place so that its sociological
function might be observed.
However, a functional approach with its emphasis upon facts
may come perilously close to another pitfall. That dangerous
condition near our traveled way is what we might term a "hardening of the categories" approach to tort law. One basic theory
or philosophy of tort law, typified by Salmond, is that any harm
is damnum sine injuria unless the situation is one for which
courts have traditionally accorded relief. The basic premise is
that "loss shall lie where it falls, unless some good purpose is
served by changing its incidence,"" and the corollary is that all
such "good purposes" have been settled by past decisions.
Precedents, specifically recovery in like or identical circumstances, determine what is compensable. The opposite philosophy
is that which may be called the dynamic or prima facie theory
of tort liability, that is, an injury is prima facie actionable unless the defendant establishes justification or excuse (privilege),
and its corollary is that bad motive plus harm equals tort. Of
course, there are areas in tort law where one or the other philosophy has bested the other, and the competition between these
approaches becomes keen when courts are confronted with such
new assertions of interests as privacy or unfair competition.
The stagnant approach is a situational one - stressing factual
resemblance rather than the implications of theory or doctrine.
The dynamic approach stresses the ramifications and implica8. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS, C. 1 (6th ed. 1924), reprinted in COHEN & COHEN,
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 210, 213 (1951). See also
Goodhart, The Foundations of Tortious Liability, 2 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1938).
9. See Seavey, Bad Motive Plus Harm Equals a Tort, 26 .ST. JOHN'S L. REv.

279 (1952) ; the basic analysis by Holmes in Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92,
44 N.E. 1077 (1896); and Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1927).
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tions of principle rather than fact similarity. Superficially, it
would seem that fact stress inhibits the free development of law
to the needs of the times.
How does Cases on the Law of Torts avoid the pitfall? This
reviewer feels that safe navigation is accomplished by the materials marking both fact environment and principles and following the beam of sociological purpose which illuminates both.
From the lawyer's standpoint, there is a marked difference between defending or suing a public utility on the one hand, and
an ordinary citizen on the other. There is a difference between
defending a doctor in a malpractice case or in a traffic case.
Moreover, it is a difference worth noting. But for the difference
to be meaningful, we must go behind both fact situation and
doctrine to ascertain, if we can, why diverse patterns have
emerged. These materials, by organization and content, focus
attention on that which lies behind judicial selectivity. One cannot read the excellent collection of malpractice cases, covering
over sixty pages of double columns, without getting a three way
fix on facts, principles, and purpose.
This functional approach, which might be termed a horizontal
or strata classification, results in a specification or individualization, a special adaptation of general principles as they are
applied or rejected in identifiable classes or patterns of cases.
The grouping cuts across the vertical lines of intentional, negligent, and strict liability torts. The result is much the same
as if a zoologist were to group flying, terrestrial, and swimming
animals into separate groups because he was specifically interested in locomotion. In light of the purpose, such a classification
makes sense and has utility. It is presumed that Dean Green's
purpose and specific interest is the basic problem in torts, allocation of risk, or the question of who should bear the loss. If one
concedes that this is the fundamental or basic question in tort
law, then it makes sense to group cases according to where the
loss has been customarily placed rather than according to doctrine which gains or loses vitality according to the factual milieu,
at least if inquiry is provoked as to why fact context is more
important than symmetry of doctrine.
I suppose that it is poetic justice if not just to subject Cases
on the Law of Torts to a functional test. How will these materials serve as a teaching tool; what is their practical validity?
In the hands of the co-authors, all true initiates of functional
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classification, able teachers all, these materials doubtlessly are
highly proficient. They have been trained to use the tool. For
the neophyte, or one inured to a predominantly analytical and
doctrinal approach or emphasis, re-orientation is required or
confusion will ensue. The strands of doctrine placed in fact context may seem an unseemly fragmentation; synthesis may never
emerge. If there be a felt need for a systematic exposition of
doctrine and principle, these materials may be found wanting.
To some it may be disconcerting to catch fleeting and periodic
glimpses of negligence, of such doctrines as res ipsa loquitur, and
negligence per se, before such matters are more fully developed.
If a casebook is viewed as an analytical exposition of its subject
matter, perhaps doctrines and principles should be sketched at
least in outline before specific applications are presented, or
variations of doctrine and principle should be accumulated in
juxtaposition. However, pedagogical technique may function
interstitially to supply such marrow as the occasion calls for and
ramifications of doctrine may be anticipated where necessary.
In the hands of an experienced teacher of torts these materials
admit of such supplemental denouement of doctrine as student
comprehension seems to require while at the same time the importance of facts and values in the adjudicating process is highlighted to an unprecedented extent.
By their excellent choice of cases and appeal to Imagination
and pragmatism, the authors have fashioned a worthy successor
to Dean Green's original volume. The law of torts long will be
indebted to Dean Green for his perception and discernment in
seeing the forces behind rule and concept and his emphasis upon
basic values. 10 Professor Malone, whose dissection of comparative negligence and causation have exposed the anatomy of doctrine as the substance of policy," and the skilled help of Professors Pedrick and Rahl, have combined to revitalize Dean
Green's functional approach into a highly useful casebook which,
in the hands of a skilled instructor, may impart a wider understanding and insight into torts and the judicial process than
many contemporary casebooks of less ambitious and more con10. Dean Green's RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927), and JUDGE AND
JURY (1930) are minor classics and enriched tremendously the philosophy of tort
liability.
11. Professor Malone's Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60
(1956) ; Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L. REV.
61 (1945) ; and Comparative Negligence - Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 125 (1945)

tort law.

are splendid examples of an eclectic approach to
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ventional perspective. The faithful student and the faithful
reader will find that he never loses sight of the fact that law is
but a means to an end and that we live in an age of "socialization of the law." It is a tragedy that some of our victims of
conceptualism and "mechanical jurisprudence"-whether on the
bench or at the bar - who need it the most, probably will not
get the perspective which would be theirs if they studied law at
mid-Twentieth Century and had the good fortune to assimilate
their torts from these materials. For in the final analysis what
distinguishes this casebook from its fine competitors is its total
perspective and its illumination of context. Whether this is
biting off more than a freshman student can chew must be left
12
to the judgment of the individual instructor.
Henry H. Foster,Jr.*
12. For a discussion of the application of jurispudential methods to teaching
torts, see Cowan, Jurisprudence in Teaching Torts, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 444 (1957).
*Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.

